Tier 2Middle East (Gaza / Palestinian Territories)
Hamas — Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades
Non-state armed group; designated terrorist organisation (US, EU, UK); demonstrated mass-casualty attack capability; Iran-backed; part of the Axis of Resistance
Data vintage: 2025-01-01 Source: SIPRI / IISS / CRS
Assessment Summary
Hamas's Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades executed the October 7, 2023 attack — the deadliest terrorist attack since 9/11 and the largest single-day killing of Jews since the Holocaust — demonstrating sophisticated operational planning, combined arms execution, and intelligence penetration of Israeli defences. Hamas possesses an extensive rocket arsenal, underground tunnel network, and increasingly capable long-range missiles supplied by Iran. Israel's 2023–2024 Gaza campaign has significantly degraded Hamas but failed to eliminate its command structure.
Key Assessment
The October 7 attack revealed Hamas as a more capable military organisation than previously assessed by Israeli intelligence. The operation involved ~3,000 fighters in a multi-axis assault, breaching the Gaza fence at 29 points, employing motor gliders, motorcycles, and bulldozers, and demonstrating detailed foreknowledge of IDF base layouts. Despite severe attrition from 15+ months of Israeli ground operations, Hamas has maintained a functional command structure and continued rocket fire throughout. Senior leader Yahya Sinwar was killed October 2024.
"Gaza Metro" — hundreds of km of tunnels at 20–80m depth. Command, logistics, weapon storage. IDF tunnel destruction ongoing; estimated 40% destroyed as of late 2024.
October 7 demonstrated motor gliders, motorcycles, bulldozers, naval infiltration, paragliders — unprecedented multi-domain coordination for non-state actor.
Intelligence / OPSEC
High
October 7 maintained operational secrecy despite Israeli intelligence penetration of Gaza. Strict cell structure. Extensive use of couriers and offline communication.
Anti-Tank
High
Kornet ATGM, RPG-29, al-Yasin 105 rocket-propelled munition. Effective against Merkava MBTs in Gaza urban terrain. IED anti-armour specialisation.
Capability Radar
Defence Expenditure
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Key Modernisation Programs
Rocket Production Cells
Severely degraded (2024)
Underground manufacturing capability for Qassam and M-75 rockets. IDF operations have destroyed assessed majority of production infrastructure. Some capability remains.
Tunnel Reconstruction
Ongoing under fire
Tunnel construction continues even during active IDF operations. Key strategic asset. Full neutralisation requires multi-year IDF presence assessed as politically unsustainable.
Leadership Reconstitution
Ongoing
Yahya Sinwar killed October 2024. Remaining Shura Council in Qatar/Lebanon directing organisation. Military wing command dispersed in tunnels.
Order of Battle Summary
IISS Military Balance
Rocket & Missile Arsenal
Total rockets (pre-Oct 2023)
~30,000 est.
Significant proportion expended; production in Gaza severely degraded
Short-range (Qassam, <10 km)
Large numbers
Home-produced from commercial pipes and fertiliser
Medium-range (M-75, 75 km)
Significant stockpile
Threatens Tel Aviv and Ben Gurion Airport
Long-range (M-302, R-160, ~160 km)
Limited; Iranian-supplied
Pre-positioned stockpile; Fajr-5 (75 km) and Zelzal variants
Ground Forces & Tunnel Network
Al-Qassam Brigade fighters
~15,000–25,000
Post-Oct 2023 attrition est.; original force ~30,000 trained fighters
Tunnel network
500+ km (est. pre-war)
"Gaza Metro" at 20–80m depth; command, logistics, hospitals, weapon storage
Anti-tank weapons
Thousands
Kornet ATGM, RPG-29, al-Yasin 105, Tandem charges; IED network
Mortar systems
Significant
60mm / 81mm / 120mm mortars; extensively used against IDF forces
Military Doctrine & TTPs— Tactics, Techniques & Procedures · NATO Planning Relevance
Tunnel Warfare / Rocket Coercion / Political Survival
Hamas prioritises organisational survival and political coercion over military victory. The October 7, 2023 attack demonstrated sophisticated planning and combined-arms execution, but the strategic goal was to trigger an Israeli response that would rally international opinion and break normalisation trends. Tunnel infrastructure survivability-proofs Hamas against Israeli air power and is the primary military enabler.
Key TTPs
▸Tunnel network as complete logistics, command, medical, and munitions system
▸Rocket saturation to trigger Iron Dome expenditure and Israeli civilian alarm
▸Hostage-taking as strategic deterrent against full Israeli ground offensive
▸Civilian infrastructure co-location to constrain Israeli rules of engagement
▸Cross-border combined arms raid using motorcycles, paragliders, and vehicles (Oct 7 model)
▸Intelligence collection via human networks inside Israel
Known Vulnerabilities
▸Surface infrastructure fully exposed to Israeli air power
▸Tunnel network being progressively destroyed by IDF engineering operations
▸External supply entirely interdicted by naval and land blockade
▸Leadership exile in Qatar/Turkey unable to command effectively during operations
▸No air capability, no armour, no meaningful naval capability
A2/AD Approach
No formal A2/AD — relies on tunnel protection, civilian co-location, and international pressure to constrain adversary operations. Urban terrain as force equaliser. RPG/ATGM saturation to attrit armoured vehicles in close urban combat.
NATO Planning Implication
Hamas primarily threatens NATO partner Israel rather than Alliance territory. The October 7 attack triggered regional escalation with Article 5-relevant pathways (Iranian direct attack, Hezbollah northern front). Hamas survival limits Israeli ability to normalise with Arab states, maintaining chronic regional instability that draws US and Allied resources.
Procurement & Arms Transfers— open-source reporting · SIPRI · UN Panel of Experts · Reuters · AP
2024-01PlannedRockets / Munitions
Internal
Tunnel Workshop Rocket Production (Severely Constrained Post-Oct 7)
Hamas operated extensive tunnel-based workshops producing Qassam rockets, mortar rounds, anti-armour systems, and IEDs. Israeli forces documented and destroyed significant tunnel manufacturing infrastructure during the 2023–2024 Gaza ground campaign. Ability to reconstitute rocket production is severely constrained by IDF operations, blockade, and loss of trained engineers. Remaining rocket stockpile was estimated by IDF at 8,000–14,000 after the opening salvo.
Source: IDF public operations briefings / CRS / Janes
2023-10ReportedOperational Support
Receiving
Iranian Financial and Operational Support for October 7 Attacks
Iran (IRGC-QF)→Hamas
Israeli and US intelligence indicated Iran provided Hamas with funding, explosives, and anti-armour weapons, with Hamas military receiving an estimated $100M+ annually from Iran. Iran denied operational planning involvement but praised the October 7 attack. The extent of Iranian operational versus material support is assessed differently across intelligence agencies. The attacks demonstrated sophisticated planning and combined-arms execution consistent with Iranian training and advisory support.
Source: IDF / CIA public statements / Wall Street Journal / Reuters
2021-05DeliveryRockets / Missiles
Receiving
Iranian M-75 / J-80 Long-Range Rocket Supply
Iran (IRGC-QF) via Egypt Sinai routes→Hamas (Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades)
Qty: Pre-Oct 7 stockpile est. ~30,000 rockets; ~3,000 fired on October 7
Prior to October 7, 2023, Hamas had accumulated a rocket stockpile including Iranian-supplied M-75 (~75 km range) and J-80 (~80 km) rockets. Iranian supply ran via Sudan and Egyptian Sinai smuggling networks. An Iranian vessel (MV Klos-C) was intercepted in 2014 carrying M-302 rockets bound for Gaza. The October 7 opening salvo of ~3,000 rockets in 20 minutes reflected years of accumulated Iranian-supplied and domestically produced stockpile.
Source: IDF public assessments / US Congressional Research Service / Janes / Reuters