Regional threat; ballistic missile and proxy network concern
Data vintage: 2024-01-01 Source: SIPRI / IISS / CRS
Assessment Summary
Iran poses a significant regional threat through its ballistic missile programme, proxy networks (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi PMF), and expanding drone capabilities. Iran's nuclear programme is a major proliferation concern. It provides weapons and technology to Russia for use in Ukraine.
Key Assessment
Iran's advanced ballistic missile arsenal and large drone inventory represent the most significant direct military threat in the Middle East. Its nuclear programme has advanced significantly; breakout timeline is assessed at weeks. Proxy networks extend Iranian reach across the region.
Threat Indicators
Nuclear breakout timeline
▲Weeks (est.)
Drone exports to Russia
▲Active / significant
Proxy activity
▲Very High
Strait of Hormuz incidents
—Frequent
Capability Domains
Ballistic Missiles
High
Largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. Shahab, Emad, Khorramshahr, Kheibar Shekan variants. Range up to 2,000+ km.
Rockets, missiles, UAVs, ATGMs supplied to all proxies; land/sea/air smuggling routes
Military Doctrine & TTPs— Tactics, Techniques & Procedures · NATO Planning Relevance
Forward Defence — Axis of Resistance Doctrine
Iran's strategy projects deterrence forward through proxy forces rather than conventional defence. The IRGC maintains permanent presence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, creating a deterrence cordon at maximum range from Iranian territory. The Axis of Resistance keeps adversaries occupied far from Iran's borders. Direct Iranian military power is reserved for escalatory retaliation against existential threats.
▸Ballistic missile saturation strikes (demonstrated: 300+ missiles in April 2024)
▸Swarm UAV tactics using cheap Shahed-series loitering munitions
▸Underground hardened missile city network to survive first strikes
▸Maritime sea denial in Hormuz using swarm boats + Fateh-110 + mine-laying
▸Precision missile transfer to proxies as strategic force multiplier
Known Vulnerabilities
▸Air force is the weakest branch — near-zero credible manned strike aircraft
▸Dependent on proxy networks that can be surgically degraded
▸Economy severely damaged by sanctions reducing defence investment capacity
▸Underground facilities eventually locatable via OSINT surface indicator analysis
▸Nuclear programme creates escalatory ladder adversaries can deliberately exploit
A2/AD Approach
Hormuz sea denial via IRGCN swarm boats, coastal Fateh-110 batteries, C-802/Noor anti-ship missiles, and mine-laying capability. Bavar-373 and S-300PMU-2 layered air defence covering Tehran and nuclear facilities. Distributed underground missile bases hardened to survive pre-emptive strikes.
NATO Planning Implication
Iran presents a NATO Southern flank challenge through proxy network destabilisation, potential nuclear breakout threatening the non-proliferation order, Hormuz energy chokepoint control, and threat to partner Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would fundamentally alter extended deterrence requirements across the entire region.
Procurement & Arms Transfers— open-source reporting · SIPRI · UN Panel of Experts · Reuters · AP
Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in January 2025 that formalised their deepening military relationship. The treaty included provisions for military-technical cooperation, joint exercises, and arms transfers. The agreement followed the Shahed drone deal and marked the most significant Russia-Iran defence alignment since the Soviet era. Western analysts assessed the partnership as a mutual arms supply arrangement: Iran provides drones and missiles, Russia provides advanced military technology, fighter aircraft (pending), and attack helicopters.
Source: Russian MFA / Iranian MFA / Reuters / AP
2024-01DeliveryBallistic Missiles / UAS
Supplying
Ongoing Ballistic Missile and Drone Supply to Houthi Forces (Yemen)
Iran (IRGC-QF)→Houthi Forces (Yemen)
Iran continues to supply the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) with ballistic missile components, Shahed-136-derived loitering munitions, Quds-1 cruise missiles, and anti-ship weapons via Yemen's western coastline. UN Panel of Experts reports (S/2023/833 and subsequent) confirm Iranian-origin components in recovered Houthi munitions including propellant chemistry, guidance electronics, and structural materials. The supply chain enables Houthi operations against Red Sea shipping and Israel despite international naval interception efforts.
Source: UN Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2023/833) / US CENTCOM / UK MoD
2023-11ReportedPrecision Ballistic Missiles
Supplying
Precision Missile Transfer to Hezbollah (Fateh-110 / Zolfaghar)
Iran (IRGC-QF)→Hezbollah (Lebanon)
Iran's 'precision missile project' for Hezbollah has continued despite Israeli interdiction strikes on Syrian transfer routes. The programme aims to supply Hezbollah with GPS/optically-guided variants of the Fateh-110 (M-600), Zolfaghar, and possibly Kheibar Shekan class missiles with sub-50m CEP. Israeli intelligence assessed pre-2024 Hezbollah stock at 5,000+ precision-guided missiles before Israeli interdiction operations degraded this inventory during the September–October 2024 campaign. Iran continues efforts to replenish stocks.
Source: IDF public statements / IISS / FDD / Congressional Research Service
Multiple reports from mid-2023 indicated Russia and Iran were finalising a deal for Mi-28NE (export) attack helicopters. The Mi-28NE would provide Iran with a modern all-weather attack rotary-wing platform superior to its existing AH-1J Cobra fleet. The deal has not been officially confirmed by either government. If delivered, the Mi-28NE would significantly augment Iranian Army Aviation close air support capability, particularly given Iran's near-zero capacity to acquire Western platforms.
Source: Reuters / Janes / Al-Monitor / IISS
2022-09ReportedFighter Aircraft
Receiving
Iran–Russia Su-35 Fighter Acquisition Agreement
Russia→Iran (IRIAF)
Qty: Reported 24 Su-35S fighters
Multiple reports from 2022–2023 indicated Iran and Russia had agreed in principle to supply Iran with Su-35S multirole fighters, replacing some of Iran's ageing IRIAF fleet. Russian press and Western intelligence assessments indicated preliminary agreement, but confirmed delivery has not been verified by mid-2025. Russia may be reluctant to transfer its most capable export fighter amid VKS attrition in Ukraine. If delivered, Su-35S would represent a transformational improvement over Iran's current fleet of degraded F-14As and MiG-29s.
Source: Reuters / Iranian state media / ISW / IISS
2022-08DeliveryLoitering Munitions / UAS
Supplying
Shahed-136 / Shahed-238 Drone Supply to Russia
Iran (IRGC Aerospace Force)→Russia (VKS / GRU)
Qty: Est. 2,400+ Shahed-136 delivered by end 2023; jet variant (Shahed-238) deliveries reported 2024
Iran supplied Russia with Shahed-136 loitering munitions beginning in mid-2022, which Russia designated Geran-2. Over 2,400 units are assessed as having been delivered by end-2023, with a domestic Russian production line subsequently established at Alabuga. Iran also delivered the faster jet-powered Shahed-238 variant to Russia in 2024. UK, US, and EU officials confirmed the transfers and sanctioned Iranian entities involved. The deal represented Iran's most significant arms export in decades and established a strategic arms-supply partnership with Russia.
Source: UK MoD / US State Department / Reuters / AP / Bellingcat component analysis