Principal state-level threat to Euro-Atlantic security
Data vintage: 2025-05-13 Source: SIPRI / IISS / CRS
Assessment Summary
Russia remains the principal military threat to NATO. Despite attrition sustained in Ukraine, Russia retains the largest nuclear arsenal in the world and is actively reconstituting and expanding its conventional forces. It continues to invest in asymmetric, cyber, and strategic capabilities.
Key Assessment
Russia's conventional ground forces have suffered significant losses in Ukraine since 2022. However, Russia's nuclear triad remains intact and capable. Defence spending has increased sharply as a share of GDP. Industrial mobilisation is underway to replace equipment losses.
Threat Indicators
Defence spending (% GDP)
▲5.9% (2023)
Nuclear readiness
▲Elevated
Conventional force readiness
—Degraded / recovering
Cyber threat activity
▲High
Industrial output
▲Expanding
Capability Domains
Nuclear / Strategic
Critical
Largest nuclear arsenal globally. Full triad operational. Modernisation continues, but FAS 2025 notes Sarmat has faced delays and setbacks.
Land Forces
High
Large but attrited by Ukraine campaign. Active reconstitution underway. Significant armour and artillery capability remains.
Black Sea Fleet degraded. Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet retain submarine capability. SSBN force key strategic asset.
Cyber / Information
Critical
Highly sophisticated state cyber capability (APT28, Sandworm). Active information operations globally.
A2/AD
Critical
Extensive integrated air defence. S-400/S-500 systems. Kalibr and Iskander cruise/ballistic missile systems.
Space
High
Independent launch capability. Reconnaissance and navigation satellites. Counter-space capabilities.
Capability Radar
Defence Expenditure
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database
Nuclear Status
Estimated Arsenal
~5,580 total (~1,550 deployed strategic)
Declared Doctrine
Escalate-to-de-escalate posture. Nuclear use threshold lowered per 2024 doctrine update. Use possible in response to conventional attacks threatening state existence.
Heavy liquid-fuelled ICBM intended to replace Soviet SS-18/R-36M2 systems. FAS Nuclear Notebook 2025 notes the programme has faced delays and setbacks; avoid treating it as broadly deployed.
Kh-47M2 Kinzhal
Operational
Hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile. Mach 10+, ~2,000 km range. Carried by MiG-31K and Su-34. Nuclear-capable. Used to strike hardened Ukrainian targets including Patriot batteries.
3M22 Zircon (Tsirkon)
Operational (2023)
Ship- and submarine-launched hypersonic cruise missile. Mach 9, ~1,000 km range. Deployed on Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates and Yasen-M submarines. Designed to defeat AEGIS-class defences.
Su-57 Felon
Limited production
5th-generation multirole fighter. ~20 operational as of 2024. Production increasing but constrained by microelectronics shortages.
S-500 Prometheus
Initial deployment
Long-range air and missile defence. Engages hypersonic glide vehicles, ballistic missiles, and low-orbit satellites. Complementary to S-400 at lower altitudes.
Force Reconstitution
Ongoing
Industrial mobilisation to replace losses in Ukraine. T-72/T-80 reactivation from storage. Recruitment expansion. Munitions production tripled 2022–24.
Order of Battle Summary
IISS Military Balance
Ground Forces
Active personnel
~830,000
As of 2024; significant expansion underway
Main battle tanks
~1,500 active
Significant losses in Ukraine; ~3,000+ in storage
Artillery systems
~4,000+
Including tube and rocket artillery
Lancet-3 loitering munition
High-volume production
Domestically produced; ~10,000+ expended in Ukraine; highly effective against armour
Air Forces
Combat aircraft
~1,000+
Fighter/multirole
~600
Su-27/30/35, MiG-29/31 family
Bombers
~140
Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS, Tu-160
Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ALBM
Operational
Mach 10+ hypersonic; ~2,000 km range; MiG-31K/Su-34 carried; nuclear-capable
Naval
SSBNs
10–11
Delta III/IV, Borei-A class
Attack submarines
~30
Akula, Yasen-M, Kilo/Improved Kilo class
Major surface combatants
~15
3M22 Zircon (Tsirkon)
Operational (2023)
Hypersonic cruise missile; Mach 9; ~1,000 km range; ship- and submarine-launched
Missiles & Electronic Warfare
Iskander-M / Iskander-K
~120 launchers
SRBM and land-attack cruise missile variant; 500 km range; nuclear-capable
Kalibr (3M14) cruise missile
Sub + surface launched
~1,500–2,500 km range; extensively used in Ukraine for infrastructure strikes
Kh-101 / Kh-102 cruise missile
Air-launched (Tu-95MS/Tu-160)
~5,500 km range; conventional/nuclear variants; primary strategic strike weapon
Shahed-136 / Geranium-2
High-volume (Iranian supply + domestic)
Loitering munition; now co-produced in Russia as Geranium-2
Electronic warfare systems
Extensive fleet
Krasukha-4 (SAR suppression), Murmansk-BN (HF jamming), Zhitel (GNSS denial). Highest-capability EW force outside USA.
Military Doctrine & TTPs— Tactics, Techniques & Procedures · NATO Planning Relevance
New Generation Warfare (Gerasimov Doctrine)
Russia's doctrine integrates conventional, nuclear, cyber, information, and proxy operations into a continuous non-linear conflict. It blurs peace and war, using ambiguity to achieve objectives below NATO's Article 5 threshold. Demonstrated in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), Syria (2015), and the full-scale Ukraine invasion (2022).
Key TTPs
▸Mass artillery / MLRS fires as the primary tactical instrument — attrition over manoeuvre
▸EW/SIGINT jamming to blind adversary C2, drone operations, and precision munitions
▸Nuclear signalling to deter Western escalation above acceptable thresholds
▸Strategic bombing of civilian energy infrastructure as deliberate coercion
▸Cyber operations timed with kinetic strikes for combined psychological effect
▸Proxy / private military forces (Africa Corps) for deniable power projection
Known Vulnerabilities
▸Logistics and sustainment — catastrophically demonstrated in Ukraine 2022
▸Centralised command — vulnerable to C2 decapitation
▸High VKS attrition rate in contested airspace; replacement of pilots slow
▸Inter-arms coordination failures documented at brigade level in Ukraine
A2/AD Approach
Layered IADS: S-400/S-500 long-range + Pantsir-S1 short-range covers most of NATO eastern approaches. Iskander-M ballistic missiles hold NATO airfields and logistics at risk to 500 km. Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles for deep strike to 2,000+ km. Kaliningrad A2/AD bubble physically closes the Baltic Sea to NATO surface operations in conflict.
NATO Planning Implication
Russia's doctrine explicitly targets NATO decision-making speed and Alliance cohesion. Hybrid operations begin before Article 5 thresholds. NATO requires 72-hour Baltic reinforcement credibility, robust counter-EW, and SEAD capability to suppress Russian IADS. Nuclear stationing in Belarus closes the strategic buffer to Poland.
Procurement & Arms Transfers— open-source reporting · SIPRI · UN Panel of Experts · Reuters · AP
2024-03DeliveryStrategic Bombers
Internal
Tu-160M Strategic Bomber New-Build Programme
Russia (PJSC Tupolev / Kazan Aviation Plant)→Russia (VKS Long Range Aviation)
Qty: First new-build Tu-160M (Nikolai Kojemyako) delivered January 2022; 2–3 additional hulls in production
Russia has resumed Tu-160 Blackjack strategic bomber production for the first time since 1992. The first new-build Tu-160M was delivered to the VKS in January 2022. The upgraded variant features new NK-32-02 engines with 10% greater thrust, modernised avionics, and expanded Kh-101 cruise missile compatibility. Putin has stated a target of 50 Tu-160M aircraft. Production pace remains limited by industrial capacity constraints and component supply chain disruptions from Western sanctions.
Source: Russian MoD announcement / IISS Military Balance 2024 / RIA Novosti (public statements)
2024-01DeliveryBallistic Missiles
Receiving
DPRK KN-23 / KN-25 Ballistic Missile Deliveries to Russia
North Korea (DPRK)→Russia
Qty: Est. 5,000–6,000 KN-23 missiles (US/ROK assessment)
North Korea supplied an estimated 5,000–6,000 KN-23 quasi-ballistic missiles and significant quantities of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells to Russia for use in Ukraine. US and South Korean intelligence confirmed deliveries from late 2023. Ukrainian forensic analysis recovered KN-23 debris with Korean-language markings. The transfers represent a fundamental shift in DPRK strategic posture — active participation in a major conventional conflict as a munitions supplier.
Source: White House NSC public statements / US DOD / ROK National Intelligence Service / Reuters
2024-01DeliveryPersonnel / Military Cooperation
Receiving
North Korean Troops Deployed to Russia (Military Service Agreement)
North Korea (DPRK)→Russia
Qty: Est. 10,000–12,000 DPRK personnel (US/ROK, Oct 2024)
The United States and South Korea confirmed in October 2024 that North Korea had deployed approximately 10,000–12,000 troops to Russia for service in the Kursk Oblast theatre of operations. The deployment — the first DPRK military operation outside the peninsula since the Korean War — occurred under a Russia-DPRK mutual defence cooperation agreement signed by Putin and Kim Jong Un in June 2024. US officials confirmed DPRK personnel sustained significant casualties in combat by January 2025.
Source: White House NSC statement Oct 2024 / US DOD / ROK NIS / Reuters
Russia completed delivery of Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems to Belarus in 2023, fulfilling a commitment announced by Putin in June 2023 alongside the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons. The transfer included training for Belarusian crews and nuclear delivery procedures under the June 2023 Russia-Belarus nuclear cooperation agreement. Belarus is the first country since the Cold War to receive Russian tactical nuclear weapons on its territory.
Source: Putin public statement June 2023 / Belarusian MoD / Reuters / AP
2023-06AgreementLoitering Munitions / UAS
Receiving
Iranian Shahed-136 Drone Domestic Production Licence
Iran (IRGC)→Russia·Est. $1.75B (reported)
Qty: Production capacity: est. 6,000+ Geran-2 per year (Alabuga SEZ)
Following initial deliveries of Shahed-136 loitering munitions in 2022, Russia and Iran concluded an arrangement for domestic Russian production of the platform at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. Designated Geran-2 in Russian service, production at this facility began in 2023. Over 3,000 Shahed/Geran variants have been used against Ukrainian infrastructure targets through 2024. The arrangement significantly reduces Russian dependence on Iranian supply chains.
Source: Reuters / AP / UK MoD Intelligence Updates / Ukrainian Air Force public reporting
2022-12DeliveryAir Defence
Supplying
S-400 Triumf Deliveries to India (Ongoing)
Russia→India·$5.43B (2018 contract)
Qty: 5 regiments (2 delivered by 2022; remaining deliveries delayed by Ukraine war)
India's $5.43B contract for five S-400 Triumf air defence regiments has been partially fulfilled, with two of five squadrons delivered by late 2022. Remaining deliveries have been delayed by Russia's redirection of industrial capacity to the Ukraine conflict and US CAATSA sanctions pressure on India. India has resisted US pressure to cancel the deal. The S-400 provides India with a long-range multi-threat air defence capability covering Sino-Indian border regions.
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database / Reuters / Times of India / CRS